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Liability of Marine Surveyors for Loss of Surveyed
Vessels: When Someone Other than the Captain
Goes Down with the Ship
Shipping almost necessarily entails loss and injury to ships, cargo,
human life and the environment.' As a matter of course, the shipper,
carrier and maritime worker will bear some of these costs. In addition,
however, today's admiralty courts accommodate a growing number of
other parties seeking to avoid the high costs associated with lost life and
environmental cleanup. 2 These litigants include marine engineers,
shipbuilders, stevedores, 3 towage companies, and marine surveyors and
classification societies. 4 This note examines the various theories of mal-
practice liability advanced against marine surveyors and classification so-
cieties in the last few decades.
Part I of this note begins by describing the work of marine surveyors.
It then argues that surveying is endemic to the shipping process, and that
both the hull and cargo surveyor have important functions in light of
business practice and federal regulation of shipping. Part II analyzes sev-
eral recent cases brought against surveyors on a negligence theory. It
organizes this discussion into the classic elements of the negligence ac-
tion: duty, breach, causation and damage. In so doing, Part II examines
defenses often interposed by surveyors in negligence actions. It further
I G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 485 (2d Ed. 1985) [hereinafter GILMORE
& BLACK]. Gilmore & Black say, for instance,
But ships steam at night, and in all weather, and the combination of their huge momentum
and limited braking power makes the averting of collision a matter of constant vigilance and
proper and timely action; there is human failure on all points. Crowded harbors and nar-
row channels remain perilous, and in some cases are growing more so .... [T]he marine
collision is still a phenomenon of frequent incidence, and the litigation resulting from it
continues to grow.
Id.
2 See, e.g., Bosnor v. Tug L.A. Barrios, 796 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving seven parties
including the cargo owners, the freight forwarded, the tug owner, the tug in rem, the stevedore and
the marine surveyor).
3 A "stevedore" is: "One who works at or is responsible for loading and unloading ships in
port." WBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1141 (1973).
4 Despite the obscurity of the surveyor to those outside of maritime professions, the courts have
recognized the importance of this profession to maintaining safe sea travel. For instance, the court
in Young v. Clear Lake Yacht Basin, 337 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Tex. 1972), commented that:
A marine surveyor, particularly one who engages in the burgeoning pleasure boat field
where the majority of boat owners are not educated and experienced mariners, performs an
indispensable service, often a life-saving service to his clientele. Whether the survey be
conducted for insurance purposes or for the purchase or sale of a vessel, this examination
may be, in all likelihood, the only one made by an experienced hand. The landlocked pub-
lic perhaps can rely on workmen to inspect and repair most major household appliances
and not be placed in jeopardy of serious injury or death, at least in the majority of instances,
in the event that the repairman inspects in a cursory manner or performs substandard work.
But reliance by laymen on such skilled professionals as marine surveyors . . . [is] one of
which the law must take cognizance in a proper case.
Id. at 1319.
While the Clear Lake court did not state what duties it required of surveyors, it did say that, given
the social utility of surveyors, courts should not assess liability against them blithely. Id.
explains why courts have failed to apply the presumptions of unseawor-
thiness stemming from the multi-faceted unseaworthiness doctrine,
5
which would otherwise impose liability on surveyors in ship loss cases.
Part III then discusses the contractual-warranty theory of liability devel-
oped in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. 6 The discus-
sion focuses on how the two-pronged holding in Ryan was changed by
the 1972 Amendments of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act 7 (LHWCA) and by the courts' current reluctance to
imply a warranty against non-negligent third parties. It also explains the
rationale of the courts in refusing to apply the warranty to marine
surveyance cases. Finally, Part IV analyzes the current posture of sur-
veyor malpractice law. It suggests that the federal courts are justified in
restricting surveyor liability to the negligence action, despite the diffi-
culty of proving negligence in ship loss cases. However, it recommends
that the courts declare and the legislature decree as void provisions in
surveyance contracts which disclaim liability for negligence or which re-
quire indemnity from the vessel owner. Part IV further recommends that
Congress eliminate the incentive to sue surveyors created by the Limited
Liability Act.8 Finally, it recognizes that governmental licensing, testing
and training requirements which have played an important role in other
professions might aid the marine surveyance profession and shipping in
general.
I. Background: Marine Surveyance
In the eyes of the law, a marine surveyor is a professional. In partic-
ular, the courts have defined a marine surveyor as a skilled workman
whose profession "is to assist the judgment of the master as to his pro-
ceedings to repair damage or sell the ship." 9 The survey is designed "to
protect [the master] in the fair discharge of his difficult and often criti-
cally responsible duty [to make the vessel seaworthy] .. . by giving him
the aid of ... other men of sound judgment." 10 Put more simply, a
marine surveyor is a person who inspects ships to determine their
seaworthiness.
Surveyors are not required by federal law to be licensed or to have
any particular type of training." Nevertheless, most surveyors have
some previous experience in naval engineering, waterway navigation or
sailing.' 2 Once a person enters the surveying profession, though, that
person holds himself or herself out as" 'possessing the degree of skill
5 See infra note 74.
6 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
7 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1982). See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
8 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1982). See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
9 Bradshaw v. Monk, 1952 A.M.C. 53, 54 (Super. Ct. Wash. 1952).
10 Id.
11 Telephone interview with John Ferband, Lakes and Eastern Marine Surveyors (October
1988). For instance, Title 46 of the U.S. Code contains no licensing or training requirements for
surveyors.
12 J. Ferband, supra note 11.
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commonly possessed by others in the same employment.' "13 For this
reason, some courts have held that "a marine surveyor will be held to a
standard of 'good marine surveying'" and will be liable in the event that
the surveyor fails to act in accordance with the reasonable customs of his
profession at the locale of the tort.14
A. Hull Surveyance
Generally, the work of a surveyor falls into two categories: hull
surveyance and cargo surveyance.' 5 In the broad sense of the term, the
"hull surveyor" examines the entire ship and its fixtures and appliances
to determine seaworthiness. In the narrow sense of the term, a "hull
surveyor" is one who inspects the superstructure of the ship for leaks,
worn surfaces and structural weaknesses which could cause leakage or
sinking of the vessel.1 6 Federal law requires these inspections to deter-
mine that a vessel "is of a structure suitable for the service in which it is
to be employed."' 7 Although these inspections are carried out under the
auspices of the Coast Guard,18 the Coast Guard is permitted by federal
statute to rely upon the reports of ship classification societies such as the
American Bureau of Shipping in issuing certificates of inspection to ves-
sels.' 9 The Coast Guard may also elect to appoint surveyors as its agents
in issuing certificates of inspection. 20 The frequency of federally re-
quired inspections for vessels varies from once a year to once every three
years, depending on the type of vessel.21
For commercial reasons, however, shipowners enlist the services of
commercial classification societies and ad hoc surveyors more often than
required under federal law. Shipbuilders design vessels according to
13 Bradshaw, 1952 A.M.C. at 54 (quoting Potter v. Ocean Hill Ins. Co., 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,335,
1173 (D. Mass. 1837)).
14 Id. See also Krohnert v. Yacht Sys. Hawaii, Inc., 4 Haw. App. 190, 644 P.2d 738, 742 (1983).
15 Telephone interview with Captain Greg Dudko, American Marine Surveyors (August 1988).
16 Id.
17 46 U.S.C. § 3305(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Federal inspection and certification of vessels is re-
quired of: "(1) freight vessels. (2) nautical vessels. (3) offshore vessels. (4) passenger vessels. (5)
sailing school vessels. (6) seagoing barges. (8) small passenger vessels. (9) steam vessels. (10) tank
vessels. (11) fishing processing vessels. (12) fish tender vessels." 46 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. III 1985).
See also generally 46 C.F.R. § 2 (1987) (describing inspection requirements for certification); GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 1, at 986-88 (describing extensive federal regulation of vessels and their cargos
by the Coast Guard).
18 46 U.S.C § 2104 (Supp. III 1985) provides that the Coast Guard, under the authority of the
Department of Transportation, has power to issue certificates of inspection.
19 46 U.S.C. § 3316(a) (Supp. III 1985). The section provides in pertinent part: "In carrying out
this part, the Secretary may rely on reports, documents and certificates issued by the American Bu-
reau of Shipping or a similar classification society .... Id.
20 46 U.S.C. § 3316(c) (Supp. III 1985).
21 46 U.S.C. § 3307 (Supp. III 1985). This section provides in part that
each vessel subject to inspection shall undergo an initial inspection for certification before
being put into service. After being put into service-
(1) each passenger vessel and nautical school vessel shall be inspected at least once a year;
(2) each small passenger vessel, freight vessel or offshore supply vessel of less than 100
gross tons, and sailing school vessel shall be inspected at least once every three years; and,
(3) any other vessel shall be inspected at least once every two years.
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plans and specifications of classification societies, 22 as well as regulations
enforced by the Coast Guard.23 Upon completion of the vessel, the ship
is surveyed to insure the seaworthiness of the hull and compliance with
various safety standards. The ship is later surveyed on a periodic basis by
the classification society to determine whether it still complies with classi-
fication society standards.2 4 Periodic surveys completed by owners, and
required by federal law, function not only to "certify the [continued]
soundness and seaworthiness of vessels," '25 but also are a "prerequisite
to registry of marine registration and of procurement of insurance upon
them and their operations. ' 26 Moreover, ad hoc surveyors are often
needed to insure a ship prior to a voyage, to sell the ship, to investigate
the cause of marine accidents, and to determine that repairs to the ship
are properly made.
27
Exact surveying standards vary according to the type of vessel sur-
veyed. Because of the greater consequences of capsize for vessels carry-
ing passengers or dangerous chemicals, federal law and classification
society standards for these types of vessels are more rigorous.28 In gen-
eral, federal laws and regulations guiding surveyors dictate standards for
"(1) [the] design, construction, alteration, repair and operation of [the
vessel], including superstructures, hulls, fittings, equipment, appliances,
propulsion machinery, auxiliary machinery and accommodations for pas-
sengers and crew... ; (2) lifesaving equipment... ; [and] (3) firefighting
equipment. '29 In addition, classification societies and other surveyors
help assure the seaworthiness of a vessel by their own experience and
through specific rules governing hull surveys.30 Such annual survey
22 See, e.g., AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, RULES FOR BUILDING AND CLASSING STEEL VESSELS
§ 3.1 (1987 & 1988 Supp.) [hereinafter ABS RULES] (describing materials to be used in construction
of steel vessels). This function of classification societies has been the subject of litigation. See, e.g.,
Shipping Corp. of India v. American Bureau of Shipping, 603 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (involv-
ing an alleged failure of the A.B.S..properly to oversee the construction of Yugoslavian vessels to be
used as "Ore-Bulk-Oil Vessels").
23 See L. KENDALL, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 352-55 (1986).
24 See, e.g., ABS RuLEs, supra note 22, at § 45.1. The ABS RULES for steel vessels in salt water
service, for example, require a vessel owner to inspect the hull every year, machinery and electric
installation every year, and fire tube boilers during their fourth and sixth year. Other types of in-
spections are done pursuant to special non-annual surveys. Id. at §§ 45.1, 45.19.
25 46 U.S.C. § 7501 (Supp. III 1985) (stating the purpose of the related certification require-
ment). Indeed, the purpose of steamship inspection law was divined in Pacific Shrimp Co. v. United
States Dep't of Transp., 375 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (W.D. Wash. 1974), as "the promotion of seagoing
safety." Furthermore, the courts ought to "liberally construe" the statutes to promote this purpose.
Id.
26 Shipping Corp., 603 F. Supp. at 803.
27 G. Dudko, supra note 15.
28 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3703 (Supp. III 1985) (permitting the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation to establish special regulations pertaining to the carriage of dangerous cargos). See
also 46 C.F.R. §§ 146.02-.12 (1987) (requiring a master to inspect military explosives carried as
cargo); 46 C.F.R. §§ 150-153 (1987) (regarding special regulations for stowage of dangerous bulk
cargos).
29 46 U.S.C. § 3306 (Supp. III 1985) (specifying the Department of Transportation's (Coast
Guard's) authority to promulgate safety standards).
30 ABS RULES, supra note 22, at § 45.1. Section 45.1 requires, as part of an annual survey, in-
spection of:
a. Protection of Openings ....
b. Freeing ports together with bars, shutters and hinges.
19891 NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
rules, together with special and ad hoc surveys, serve to assure the sea-
worthiness of the surveyed vessels.
B. Cargo Surveyance
In addition to the hull surveyor, carriers rely upon cargo surveyors
to insure the safety of ships at the time of carriage. Prior to a voyage,
cargo surveyors determine whether stevedores have properly loaded and
packaged the ship's cargo.31 To assure compliance with federal law, the
surveyor must determine that the ship is properly equipped to carry the
cargo, and that the proper precautions have been taken concerning dan-
gerous chemicals such as liquid gas and explosives.3 2 In practice, the
cargo surveyor will also weigh the cargo before and after voyage. He or
she also will check for spoilage, and, if spoilage occurs, investigate the
cause.33 Since the cargo surveyor inspects the vessel just prior to car-
riage, he or she will also often check machinery, boilers and safety fea-
tures such as life boats and safety equipment.34 Like the hull surveys, the
cargo surveys are necessitated by the marine insurance industry and re-
quirements of shippers.
35
II. Surveyors' Liability for Negligent Surveys
According to Prosser and Keeton, the negligence cause of action
first arose out of the "liability of those who professed to be competent in
c. Protection of the crew: guard rails, lifelines, gangways, and deck houses accommodat-
ing crew.
d. Verification of loading guidance and stability data as applicable. Loading instruments
accepted for classification are to be confirmed in working order by use of the approved
check conditions and so reported upon.
e. Verification that no alterations have been made to the hull or superstructures which
would affect the calculation determining the position of load lines.
f. Anchoring and mooring equipment....
g. Confirmation that no significant changes have been made to the arrangement of struc-
tural fire protection and confirmation of the operation of manual and/or automatic fire
doors, if fitted.
h. Structural areas of the hull particularly susceptible to corrosion, including spaces used
for salt-water ballast, as accessible. Thickness gauging may be required.
i. For vessels engaged in the dry bulk cargo trade, at each Annual Survey after Special
Survey No.3, holds and 'tween deck spaces.
j. [Special rules for tankers]
Id.
The ABS rules illustrate the function of classification societies in setting standards for vessels.
See, e.g., Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Germanisher Lloyds, 634 F.2d 874, 875 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981),
wherein a classification society was defined as "an organization that (I) sets standards for the quality,
integrity and seaworthiness of ocean-going vessels; and (2) after inspecting a vessel, classifies it as
conforming to those standards."
31 See, e.g., Skibs A/S Gyfle v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 438 F.2d 803 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
831 (1971).
32 46 U.S.C. § 3703 (Supp. III 1985). This section permits the Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate regulations governing the stowage of dangerous cargos. Moreover, 46 C.F.R. §§ 150-
51, promulgated pursuant to the statute, sets elaborate requirements for compatibility and storage
of dangerous chemicals, and 46 C.F.R. § 151.04 requires inspection and certification of certain ves-
sels carrying these cargos. Finally, 46 C.F.R. § 146 contains rules covering stowage of military
explosives.




certain public callings. ''3 6 Namely, "[a] carrier, an innkeeper, a black-
smith, or a surgeon was regarded as holding oneself out to the public as
one in whom confidence might be reposed, and ... as assuming an obli-
gation to give proper service, for the breach of which ... he might be
liable." 37 Like the carrier discussed by Prosser and Keeton, the surveyor
engages in a "public profession"; he or she holds himself or herself out
to the public as capable to render an important social service. For this
reason, and for want of another viable theory of liability, most cases dis-
cussing surveyor malpractice center on the negligence cause of action.
Given Prosser and Keeton's textbook definition of the negligence
action, in order for a surveyor to be liable to a carrier, the carrier must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the surveyor owed a
duty to conform to a standard of conduct for the protection of the car-
rier; (2) the surveyor failed to conform to the standard of conduct for the
protection of the carrier; (3) there exists a reasonably close causal con-
nection between the conduct of the surveyor and the resulting injury of
the carrier; and, (4) the carrier's injury consists of some actual loss or
damage.38 Each of these elements is significant, and as to each the de-
fendant may interpose defenses. The existence of these defenses and the
fact that in ship loss cases the cause of loss is often unknown make the
plaintiff's case difficult. The following discussion organizes surveyors
malpractice cases under the elements of the negligence cause of action.
A. The Surueyor's Duty of Due Care
Textbook wisdom dictates that negligence standards are defined
with respect to Judge Learned Hand's famous formula-namely, a negli-
gent act is one for which the cost of avoiding the injury multiplied by the
possibility of the injury is less than the cost of the injury.3 9 Nevertheless,
whether a court is likely to find a professional liable in a malpractice case
is more likely to depend on particular facts about the profession, past
court rulings and common sense than on Learned Hand's calculus.
1. Definition of the Surveyor's Duties
Bradshaw v. Monk, 40 a comparatively early surveyor malpractice case,
underscores one aspect of the marine surveyor's professional obliga-
tions. In Bradshaw, a purchaser of a leaky yacht sued a surveyor for fail-
ing to discover the yacht's need of repair at the time of purchase. Finding
in the favor of the purchaser, the Bradshaw court observed that the stan-
36 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 161 (5th Ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON].
37 Id.
38 Id. at 164-65 (defining elements ofnegligence cause of action). See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
Bureau Veritas, 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying standards to a marine surveyor case),
aft'd, 478 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1973).
39 Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492
(1944); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). However, scholars do not
agree as to the usefulness of this formula, or what standard to employ in negligence cases. See Cala-
bresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, in M. KUPERBERG & C. BErrz, LAW, EcoNoM-
ICS AND PHILOSOPHY 154 (1983).
40 1952 A.M.C. 53 (Super. Ct. Wash. 1952).
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dard of care for a surveyor is dependent on local custom in marine
surveyance. 4 1 The court relied on the general principle in admiralty mal-
practice cases that "ordinary care is that degree of skill which reasonably
may be expected of one in the given circumstances .... It is that degree
of skill that prudent men in the business in hand would be likely to exer-
cise under the same circumstances." 42 Such a principle applies with spe-
cial force to land-based maritime contractors who are required by the
courts to perform in a workmanlike manner.
43
Bradshaw's reference to professional custom is similar to general
malpractice doctrine in medicine, law, and accounting. 44 Later cases,
though, have focused specifically on the duties of marine surveyors and
classification societies. For instance, the often cited case of Great American
Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas4 5 defines the dutie s of a classification society
as: "1. . . . to survey and classify vessels in accordance with rules and
standards established and promulgated by the society for that purpose
... [and] 2. to [use] due care in detection of defects in the ship it surveys
and the corollary of notification thereof to the owner and charterer.
46
In Great American, though, neither the District Court nor the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found the classification society negligent. Rather,
the District Court observed first that the defendant's failure to report
"waviness of the transverse bulkhead" 47 was not clearly negligent;48 and,
even to the extent that the defendant might be negligent, the plaintiff
insurance company could not recover because it failed to prove a causal
connection with the vessel's eventual sinking.49 Nevertheless, the rule of
Great American is significant in its recognition of the surveyor's profes-
sional duty to discover and warn concerning defects in a vessel. Such
recognition undermines the argument sometimes made by classification
societies that such societies classify vessels, but do not determine their
seaworthiness. 50 Later case law has faithfully adhered to the Great Ameri-
can definition. 51
41 Id.
42 Pan-American Petroleum Transp. Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 281 F. 97, 108 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 586 (1922).
43 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. La. 1978), modified, 674
F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). Therein, the court said, "I find that one who
enters into a maritime contract for repairs or other services impliedly agrees to perform in a diligent
and workmanlike manner. This obligation does not require that there be privity between the party
who owes the obligation and the one to whom it is owed." Id. at 1295.
44 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 185-88.
45 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
46 Id. at 1011-12.
47 Id. at 1013.
48 Id at 1011.
49 Id. at 1006.
50 See, e.g., Gulf Tampa Drydock v. Germanisher Lloyds, 634 F.2d 874, 878 (5th Cir. 1981).
There, the defendant contended that "as a classification society, it owed no relevant duty to the
shipowner, and thus could not be liable." Id.
51 See Gulf Tampa, 634 F.2d at 878 (citing Great American, 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972));
Krohnert v. Yacht Sys. Hawaii, Inc., 4 Haw. App. 190, 664 P.2d 738 (1983) (holding surveyor liable
for failure to discover dry rot on ship's hull).
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2. Variation by Agreement
While surveyors' duties are dictated in part by federal law and pro-
fessional customs, courts have held that the parties to a surveyance con-
tract may modify their duties by agreement. This is not surprising since
the surveyor's task in any particular assignment may vary greatly. In
Riverway Co. v. Trumbull River Services, Inc. ,52 the court found the defend-
ant surveyance company liable for failing to exercise due care to prevent
the sinking of a towed barge.53 The case involved a third-party claim
against a surveying firm, Cairo Marine Industries, which promised under
its contract with the towage company to "take charge of the situation,
inspect [Barge] RW-381, determine what needed to be done, and do
whatever needed to be done ... to keep RW-381 from sinking."' 54 De-
spite the fact that "marine surveyors sent to a scene of distress do not
possess the authority or ability to take remedial action," the court found
that Cairo was negligent in failing to save the barge.55
In contrast to the upward adjustment of duties in Riverway, survey-
ors more often claim that their duties have been adjusted downward by
provisions in surveyance contracts that either disclaim liability or seek
indemnity from the carrier. For instance, in the recent case of Bosnor v.
Tug L.A. Barrios,56 a surveyor, World Marine Association, argued that it
owed no duty to the owner of the surveyed vessel. 57 The surveyor relied
on a pro forma statement in its report:
The surveyor agrees to use best efforts in behalf of those for whom the
survey is made; however, this report is issued subject to the conditions
that it is understood and agreed that neither the office nor any sur-
veyor thereof will have any liability for any inaccuracy, errors or omis-
sions, whether due to negligence or otherwise, in excess of the actual
charge made for this survey, and that use of this report shall be con-
strued to be an acceptance of the foregoing.58
Nevertheless, the court in Bosnor looked askance upon this provision
and held that the defendant had not proven that the plaintiffs agreed to
the limiting language.59 Other cases involving maritime service con-
tracts have upheld these limitation clauses. 60 For instance, in the case of
Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran Co., 61 a court upheld a clause limiting
a repairman's liability for negligence to $300,000. It did so because a
widespread industry practice demonstrated Alcoa's knowledge of the
contract term,62 and enforcement would not severely threaten public pol-
52 674 F.2d 1146 (7th Cir. 1982).
53 Id. at 1152-53.
54 Id. at 1152.
55 Id at 1153.
56 796 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1986).
57 Brief for Appellee World Marine Ass'n, Inc. at 13-16, Bosnor, 796 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1986)
(No. 84-2212).
58 Bosnor, 796 F.2d at 781 n.3.
59 Id. at 781.
60 See, e.g., infra note 61. See also supra note 57.
61 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
62 Id. at 55.
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icy. 63 Nevertheless, even courts allowing waivers and indemnity will de-
clare clauses limiting liability for gross negligence invalid as opposed to
public policy.64
B. Breach of the Duty of Due Care
1. Proving Negligence
Although one may appeal to professional custom, federal law, classi-
fication society rules and contractual agreements as sources of surveyors'
duties, often it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether any duty
was breached. When a ship is lost at sea the evidence of any misfeasance
by the surveyor may be lost with the ship. The case of Great American
Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas 65 is once again exemplary. In that case, the
vessel Tradeways II was enroute from Antwerp to the Great Lakes when it
flooded and sank. 66 Although some experts later suspected that the
cause of loss was the collapse of the transverse bulkheads, 67 they could
not confirm this theory since the captain's log had been suspiciously lost
overboard before the crew's rescue.
68
A year later, the loss of the Pensacola in Steamship Mutual Underwriting
Association v. Bureau Veritas69 presented the same scenario. In that case,
the carrier's insurance company argued that the classification society was
negligent in its failure to check corrosion on the ship's hull. The court
could not completely resolve the issue because of the loss of the ship.
The court said:
[T]he plaintiff has not shown what caused the vessel to sink. True, the
vessel is gone and plaintiff cannot inspect it to determine the exact
cause. Nevertheless, as we have said, plaintiff has failed to show that
the sinking was caused by some defect which was discoverable by a
completely adequate survey.
70
Cases such as Great American and Steamship Mutual illustrate a disturbing
pattern in loss of ship cases: namely, the combination of a lack of physical
evidence, conflicting opinions of experts and questions of intervening
cause absolve surveyors from liability almost ab initio.
63 Id. In so doing, the court distinguished Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955),
which prevented a towage company from disclaiming liability for negligence. The distinction de-
pended in part on the fact that at the time Bisso was decided a small number of companies had almost
monopolistic control of the towage industry.
64 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1257, 1298 (E.D. La. 1978), modi-
fied, 674 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
65 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
66 Id. at 1001-02.
67 A "bulkhead" is "an upright partition separating compartments; esp.: such a partition sepa-
rating compartments on a ship." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED
293 (1976).
68 338 F. Supp. at 1006-07.
69 380 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1973).
70 Id. at 492.
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NOTES
2. Application of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine
Because of the problem of proof, plaintiffs in ship loss cases have
argued that pursuant to "the unseaworthiness doctrine"7 1 the courts
should presume that the defendant surveyor was negligent and that the
negligence caused the injury, absent proof of due diligence by the sur-
veyor.72 Any discussion of "the unseaworthiness doctrine" is likely to
evoke confusion because the term is associated with several distinct mari-
time law principles. The term "unseaworthiness" is associated with such
court-made rules as the warranty of seaworthiness in marine' insurance
7
and the unseaworthiness remedy in marine personal injury cases. 74 In
the context of negligence cases against surveyors, though, "the unsea-
worthiness doctrine" refers to a maritime presumption "that a vessel lost
under normal conditions, with fair weather and calm seas .. .was un-
seaworthy in the absence of proof that she was improperly handled.
75
In such a case, "the owner of a [vessel] is responsible for its unseaworthi-
ness and warrants [the vessel] is '... . sufficiently staunch and strong to
withstand the ordinary perils to be encountered on the voyage.' "76
However, the courts allow a vessel owner to rebut this presumption by
showing that the surveyor exercised "due diligence to make the [ship]
seaworthy before she broke ground and put to sea, or that it was entitled
to limitation of liability."
'77
71 See infra note 74.
72 See Great American, 338 F. Supp. at 1008-09; Steamship Mutual, 380 F. Supp. at 492-93.
73 In this field, insured vessel owners are held to the "highest degree of good faith." GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 1, at 62. Thus, in order to recover for loss of a vessel, the vessel owners must have
acted diligently to prevent the loss, and in fact warrant that the vessel was seaworthy at the beginning
of its voyage. Id. The policy defense, though, is now seldom raised by underwriters provided that a
vessel owner acted carefully to make the vessel seaworthy. Id. at 65-66. Thus, Gilmore and Black
conclude that "[t]he stern requirement.., doubtless had a wholesome effect on the discipline of the
shipping industry in early, less well-policed days;... It is questionable, however, whether the pres-
ent conditions fully justify the continuance of the stringent warranty." Id.
74 "The unseaworthiness doctrine" as it applies to maritime personal injury is a remedy against a
vessel owner for injury to seamen caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It, even more so than
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), is "the principal vehicle for personal injury recoveries." GIL-
MORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 383. This doctrine traces its old and obscure roots to the Laws of
Oleron (1150 A.D.), the Laws of Hanse Townes (1597), and the Maine Ordinances of Louis XIV
(1681). Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 543 (1960). Its American inception, though,
occurred in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1902), wherein the Court held that "the vessel and her
owner are, both by English and American Law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the
proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." l at 175. Courts interpreted this fatal phrase to mean
that a shipowner is liable if "without regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy... and that if
thus unseaworthy ... one of the crew received damage as a direct result thereof." Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sanding, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922).
No court has extended this doctrine to hold non-vessel owners strictly liable for injuries caused
by unseaworthy conditions. Such an extension is unlikely given the courts' current perception that
the doctrine should not be further extended. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 403-04.
75 South Seas, Inc. v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 360 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1966).
76 Id at 1005 (quoting The Edmund Levy, 128 F. 683, 684 (2d Cir. 1904)).
77 Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agarari v. Mandazk Compagnia de Vapores, 388 F.2d 434,
436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). These exceptions coincide with exceptions to liability
under the Carriage of Goods on the Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982) [hereinafter COGSA].
COGSA prevents vessel owners from disclaiming liability for loss of goods on a bill of lading where
the loss is caused by a lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. Specifically, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1304 provides exceptions where the carrier proves that the loss was caused by an "Act of God" or
a condition "not discoverable by due diligence." Relating to both COGSA and the presumptions of
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Given the effect of this presumption in loss of ship cases, carriers
and shippers have argued that it ought to apply against surveyors when
surveyed vessels sink in fair weather. For instance, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York in In re Marine Sulfur Transportation
Corp. 78 applied the presumption of unseaworthiness against marine con-
tractors responsible for the safety of a lost vessel. In particular, the New
York court held that the presumption operated against a designer-con-
vertor (Bethlehem Steel) of a commercial vessel.79 However, this result
was soon reversed by the Second Circuit. In its opinion, the Second
Circuit distinguished between personal injury claimants and cargo claim-
ants.80 The Second Circuit further decided that neither the unseaworthi-
ness remedy for personal injury or unseaworthiness presumptions would
apply since
[t]he duty of providing the crew with a seaworthy ship runs only to the
owner, and the shipbuilder neither employs the crew nor can he con-
trol what happens to the ship once she leaves the yard. Therefore,
traditional tort concepts apply to the claim against Bethlehem and,
contrary to the trial court's conclusion, neither justice nor logic com-
pel the application against it of the permissible inference rule from the
unseaworthiness doctrine.81
Courts in marine surveyor cases have -subsequently relied on both
the precedential value and rationale used by the Marine Sulphur court in
holding that these presumptions do not apply against land based con-
tractors such as surveyors. 82
C. Reasonably Close Causal Connection
Some surveyor malpractice cases have also declined to find survey-
ors liable because of the inability of the plaintiffs to prove the element of
proximate cause, or "a reasonably close causal connection," as Prosser
and Keeton define it.83 This difficulty in showing proximate cause con-
sists of several related problems including: (1) the consequences of an
improper survey are sometimes unforeseeable; (2) the loss of a vessel is
often attributed to a force majeure; and (3) the vessel owner's failure to
repair a known defect may constitute an intervening cause. Overall, such
case law demonstrates the strength of common law defenses in negli-
gence actions against surveyors.
unseaworthiness, Gilmore & Black have written that "[u]nder the pre-statutory law the shipper made
out his prima facie case by proving loss or damage to the goods while they were in the hands of the
public carrier. The Harter Act [and COGSA] effected no change. If the carrier wanted to establish
an exemption, he had to take up the burden and bring the loss within an exception established by
law or by contract." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 183.
78 312 F. Supp 1081, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972).
79 Id. at I101.
80 Id.
81 460 F.2d at 101.
82 Great American, 338 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Steamship Mutual, 380 F. Supp. 482,
493 (E.D. La. 1973).
83 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 263.
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1. Unforeseeable Consequences
Although a surveyor is chargeable with the foreseeable conse-
quences of his or her negligence, the courts will also hold a surveyor
liable where foreseeable factors combine to produce a Rube Goldberg
type effect.8 4 The celebrated Commonwealth case of Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co.85 (Wagon Mound I) illustrates the
application of the principle to maritime law. Wagon Mound I involved
shipbuilders who sued a vessel owner when its freighter discharged oil
into the Port of Sidney; the oil ignited, destroying the plaintiffs' wharf.
The court refused to adopt the position brandished in In re Arbitration
between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co. 86 (Polemis), and instead held that a
person's liability depends on "whether the damage is of such a kind as a
reasonable man should have foreseen."
87
In this country, a similar proximate cause requirement was applied
to surveyors in Skibs A/S Gyfle v. Hyman-Michaels Co. 88 The Sixth Circuit
in Skibs decided that a defendant cargo surveyor was not liable for the
loss of cargo (steel turnings) when the turnings were damaged as a result
of avoidable but unforeseeable spontaneous combustion. 9 Skibs was
technically a contractual-warranty case and the decision was based on the
fact that the damages were not foreseeable as required by section 330 of
the Restatement of Contracts. 90 Subsequent courts have nonetheless re-
lied upon Skibs as a tort precedent because of the use of tort liability
language in the district court's opinion and because of the general recog-
nition that the case was a negligence action dressed in contract
clothing. 91
2. Acts of God
When the loss of a vessel occurs during a voyage, questions of fact
will arise as to whether a storm or other act of God caused the loss. Both
the Great American and Steamship Mutual courts considered whether storm
conditions during the voyage caused or contributed to the ship's de-
mise.92 W.F. Magann Corp. v. Tug Delilah 93 provides another illustration.
84 One classic statement of this general principle is Cardozo's opinion in Palsgrafv. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Cardozo explains the concept of proximate cause in terms
of an invasion of a legally protected interest of the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant in Palsgrafwas not
liable since the defendant's mishandling the package did not create an unreasonable probability of
invasion of the plaintiff's bodily security. Id.
85 1961 App. Cas. 388 (P. C. 1961). Prosser notes that this case has been followed in many
American jurisdictions. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 296-97.
86 [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 569 (C. A., 1921) (opinion of LJ. Bankes). Polemis became renowned for
the proposition that "when it has been once determined that there is evidence of negligence, the
person guilty of it is liable for its consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not." Id.
87 Wagon Mound I, 1961 App. Gas. at 426.
88 438 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1971).
89 Id. at 807-08.
90 Id.
91 Steamship Mutual, 380 F. Supp. 482, 493-94 (E.D. La. 1983). See also W.F. Magann Corp. v.
Tug Delilah, 434 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Va. 1977); Dillingham Tug v. Collier Carbon & Chem. Corp.,
707 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
92 Great American, 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Steamship Mutual, 380 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La.
1973).
93 434 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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Magann involved a marine surveyor hired to fit and approve the towing of
a barge. The barge subsequently capsized when it flooded and the tow-
ing crane collapsed. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs introduced strong
evidence that the capsize was due to the surveyor's failure to secure hatch
covers on the barge and to secure the crane properly, the court found for
the defendant. It reasoned that since there was "speculation that the cap-
size was caused by a large wake . . . the evidence [did] not show by a
preponderance what did cause the Barge JK-14 to capsize." '94
3. Superseding Causes
Because a vessel owner has a legal duty to make the ship seaworthy,
courts have held that a vessel owner's intervening failure to prevent the
loss is an intervening cause. This argument was one factor in the court's
decision in Great American Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas.95 Therein, the
court said that
this potential bar stems from the long-standing policy or rule that the
owner of a ship has a non-delegable duty to maintain a seaworthy ves-
sel .... [R]egardless of whether the defendants acted in violation of
rules or not, the fact remains that the owners and charterers were fully
informed of the defects. With knowledge and opportunity to remedy
the defects, [they] . . . "took a calculated risk and lost."
'96
Similar arguments prevailed in the cases of Young v. Clear Lake
Yacht 97 and In re Amoco Cadiz.98 Young concerned a surveyor who was
hired to survey a yacht after repairs. Following the survey, the yacht was
destroyed by fire caused by defective machinery. The Young court ab-
solved the surveyor due to the intervening use of the owner.99 "[T]he
use for pleasure to which the vessel was put by the Young brother," the
court wrote, "plus a total lack of proof in a careful record as to causal
facts linking this marine surveyor to the casualty compel this court to find
no liability against the defendant."' 0 0 The court in In re Oil Spill of the
Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Brittany, France 10 heard a similar argument in
that dispute over apportioning oil cleanup costs caused by a collision.
Therein, the plaintiff marine surveyor sought a partial summary judg-
ment absolving it of liability because the shipowner's (Amoco's) conduct
"was a superseding cause of the damage." 10 2 The court, however, held
that it "cannot be said at this point ... that [the carrier's] failure to per-
94 Id. at 523.
95 338 F. Supp 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
96 Id. at 1011 (quoting Skibs A/S Gylfe v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 304 F. Supp. 1204, 1220 (E.D.
Mich. 1969), afd, 438 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1971)).
97 337 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
98 1986 A.M.C. 1945 (N.D. Il. 1986).
99 Young, 337 F. Supp. at 1319.
100 Id.
101 1986 A.M.C. 1945 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
102 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment at 28,
Amoco Cadiz, 1986 A.M.C. 1945 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (MDL No. 376). Specifically, the American Bureau of
Shipping's memorandum argued that "the deficiencies in the vessel's steering gear system were well
known to the owner and operator of the vessel, Amoco, who for economic reasons of its own elected
to ignore them. Thus, any possible chain of causation between the alleged negligence of the ABS
and the injury to the claimants was broken." Id. at 28-29. See also Magee v. Bayou Teche, 548 F.
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form certain maintenance on [the vessel] and to rectify those problems
about which it had knowledge superceded the other facts .... Conse-
quently, the ABS is not entitled to summary judgment on this basis."'
0 3
D. Damages
1. Cargo and Vessel Loss
The final and most perfunctory of the elements of negligence is ac-
tual damage. While the existence of some damage is seldom in dispute,
the amount of damages, the method of calculation, and the proper the-
ory for their recovery is often debated. 10 4 Since the items of damage in a
surveyance case are peculiar to admiralty law,' 0 5 they deserve attention
here. Principally, suits against surveyors involve loss of cargo, loss of
vessels, loss or injury of seamen and cleanup costs of marine pollution.
Special statutes and case law principles have developed in these areas
which fix the liability of vessel owners to injured parties.
In the case of cargo loss, the Harter Act' 0 6 and *the Carriage of
Goods on the Seas Act'0 7 (COGSA), which were born out of interna-
tional conventions, limit the ability of a vessel owner to disclaim liability
on a bill of lading.108 Section 3 of COGSA provides that a carrier cannot
disclaim liability for failing to exercise due diligence to: "(a) Make the
ship seaworthy. (b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship. (c) Make
the holds, refrigerating and cooling chambers, and all the other parts of




Vessel loss is to a lesser extent governed by statute. When a vessel is
lost, the cost is divided between parties based on negligence law and ad-
miralty principles of indemnity and contribution. These disputes often
Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1982) (excusing a marine chemist who inspected and certified cargo tanks be-
cause of the intervening negligence of the vessel owner).
103 Amoco Cadiz, 1986 A.M.C. at 1955.
104 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 345-55, discussing how to apportion losses
among multiple tortfeasors.
105 See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 22, who conclude that land-based contractors are
within the scope of the courts' admiralty jurisdiction. As the following discussion makes clear, sev-
eral federal maritime statutes pertain to them as well.
106 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1982).
107 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1982).
108 A "bill of lading" is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(6) as "a document
evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of trans-
porting or forwarding goods, and includes an airbill." U.C.C. § 1-201(6) (1976). The system of
issuing a negotiable bill of lading issued by a sea carrier to the shipper of goods is centuries old. See
C.F. Powers, BILLS OF LADING 1-4 (1966). The bill of lading functions as an acknowledgment by the
carrier that it has received goods for shipment, as a contract for carriage and as a means for financing
and selling the goods with respect to third parties. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 93. Through-
out the last century, draftsmen of ocean bills began to include endorsements that disclaimed liability
for acts of God, perils and then even their own negligence. Id. To deal with this trend, Congress
passed the Harter Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 445, which prohibited carriers from disclaiming liability for
negligence in contracts for national carriage. The terms of the Harter Act were embodied in a set of
rules agreed upon by representatives of maritime nations meeting at the Hague between 1921 and
1924 (the "Hague Rules"). This convention invited nations to adopt the Hague Rules as the law
governing international shipping. Id. at 143. The United States subsequently adopted COGSA, 49
Stat. 1207 (1936), which affirms the Hague Rules. Id.
109 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
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involve collisions which implicate not only federal statutes, but maritime
collision rules and local customs. 110
Limitation of liability, which is another aspect of vessel loss, has an
even greater, albeit indirect, effect on the liability of surveyors. The Lim-
ited Liability Act"'I allows a shipowner to limit his or her liability for a
maritime accident to the value of his or her ship after the accident. Be-
cause the limitation is measured after the accident, it may limit the ship-
owner's liability to "a few strippings from a wreck" or to nothing at all." 12
This rule of law was created in the nineteenth century to encourage the
growth of shipping. 11 Since then, the courts and legislature have
"cooled" to the limitation principle and enacted substantial amendments
and exceptions to the rule.' 14 Nevertheless, inasmuch as the law persists,
it motivates tort victims of maritime accidents to sue parties other than
shipowners in ship loss cases. 115
2. Death and Personal Injury Losses
Injury and death of maritime workers is one of the most complex
areas of maritime law due to the presence of conflicting state and federal
remedies. In some cases, recovery is allowed under several federal stat-
utes, state workers' compensation and wrongful death laws, and maritime
case law doctrines. Important federal legislation includes: the Jones
Act,"16 which allows a seaman or his or her legal beneficiary to sue for
injury or death caused by negligence; the Death on the High Seas Act," 17
which allows a seaman's beneficiaries to sue for death caused by negli-
gence outside of coastal waters; and the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 18 which provides compensation regardless
of fault to land based workers injured in maritime service. In addition,
the practitioner should note that the case law doctrines of "maintenance
and cure" 119 and "unseaworthiness"' 20 provide remedies for injured
sailors in certain cases.
110 See T. SCHOENBAUM & A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY AND MARI-
TIME LAW 297 (1984). Although such collision cases are based on admiralty principles of collision,
the courts may determine fault by consulting statutory rules of navigation, local navigation statutes,
proven local custom and requirements of good seamanship. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 489.
111 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1982)).
112 GILMORE & BLAc, supra note 1, at 818.
113 Id. at 818-19.
114 Id. at 821, 834-47.
115 Interview with Dean William McLean, Notre Dame Law School (October 1988).
116 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). See also H. BAER, THE ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 1-9
(3d ed. 1979).
117 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1982). See also H. BAER, supra note 116, at 79; GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 1, at 360.
118 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1982). See also Staring, Meting Out Misfortune: How the Courts are Allotting the
Costs of Maritime Injury in the Eighties, 45 LA. L. REV. 907 (1985).
119 The maritime doctrine of "maintenance and cure" entitles a seaman who falls ill during his or
her service to a ship to medical treatment, a living allowance and wages until recovery. See H. BAER,
supra note 116, at §§ 1-1, 1-2.
120 See supra note 74.
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3. Environmental Cleanup Costs
Environmental cleanup damages are governed by another maze of
federal statutes, common law principles and international agreements.
For example, the well known case of United States v. Oswego Barge Co. 121
illustrates multiple claims brought under a modern pollution control
statute (the Federal Water Pollution Control Act),1 22 a nineteenth cen-
tury federal statute (the River and Harbors Act)' 23 and the federal com-
mon law of nuisance. 24 The claims in Oswego amounted to almost nine
million dollars in oil cleanup costs.'
2 5
4. Division of Losses
Each of the above categories represent losses which a marine sur-
veyor's negligence may cause. HoWever, surveyors are often not sued
directly, but as third parties for either indemnity or contribution.
Although indemnity has become less important since the 1972 amend-
ments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
contribution has become more significant. 126 Contribution became a
more equitable device for dividing these costs after the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. 127 Prior to this 1975 opin-
ion, property damage in a collision case was equally divided between
joint tortfeasors regardless of their degree of fault. 128 In recognition of
the academic criticism the rule generated, the Court in Reliable Transfer
observed that "[t]he courts of every modern nation except ours have
long abandoned that rule, and now assess damages in such cases on the
basis of proportional fault when such an allocation can reasonably be
made." 29 Thus, despite the force of stare decisis, the Court abandoned
the divided damage rule and replaced it with proportional fault. Legal
commentators, as well as practitioners, have since welcomed the
change. 13
0
III. The Contractual-Warranty Theory in Surveyor Malpractice Cases
One alternative to a negligence approach to liability for surveyors is
a contractual-warranty theory which approximates the liability of manu-
121 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup Bills: Federal Recovery of Oil
Cleanup Costs, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1761 (1980).
122 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
123 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
124 See generally Burgess v. M/V Tomano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973); Prosser, Private Action
for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966).
125 Oswego, 664 F.2d at 327-28.
126 See Staring, supra note 118, at 926. "Contract indemnity ... appears to have a somewhat
unsteady existence... [but] [t]he spirit of contribution is in full vigor, and it makes itself felt every-
where, usually at the expense of indemnity." Id.
127 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
128 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 528.
129 Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 397-98.
130 H. BAER, supra note 116, at 315. Professor Baer writes: "Whether one chooses to call the
action of the Court a 'confession of error' or 'judicial usurpation of the legislative function of Con-
gress,' the inequity of the equal division rule in litigation between parties both at fault has been
eliminated and the United States now finds itself in accord with the majority of the maritime nations
of the world." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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facturers for injuries caused by the defective design of a product. In-
deed, the Supreme Court, perhaps inadvertently, created such a cause of
action for parties injured by a breach of a land-based contractor's war-
ranty of workmanlike performance in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp. 31 Despite the fact that surveyors are land-based marine
contractors, as are stevedores, most federal courts have refused to apply
the warranty to surveyors. The courts' lack of receptivity is perhaps best
explained in terms of the history and logic of the Ryan decision.
A. The Ryan Decision
Ryan involved a stevedore company that contracted to load the Can-
ton Victory owned by the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation.' 32 The
cargo consisted of rolls of pulpboard; the stevedore loaded the rolls, but
failed to immobilize them through the use of a bottom tier of wedges
called dunnage. Later, when an employee of the same stevedore com-
pany tried to unload the rolls, the cargo moved and severely injured the
employee. Pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act' 33 (LHWCA), Ryan's insurer immediately paid the em-
ployee. The employee and the insurer then sued the vessel owner
alleging that it had failed to make the ship seaworthy and therefore was
liable pursuant to Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.'3 4 When the company ob-
tained a judgment against the shipowner, the owner then attempted to
obtain indemnity from Ryan. When faced with these multiple claims, the
Supreme Court parsed the issues on appeal as: "[first], whether the
[LHWCA] precludes a shipowner from asserting such a liability, and
[second] ... whether the liability exists where a contractor, without en-
tering into an express agreement of indemnity, contracts to perform a
shipowner's stevedoring operations and the longshoremen's injuries are
caused by the contractor's unsafe stowage of the ship's cargo."' 35 The
Court "answered the first question in the negative and the second in the
affirmative."' 3 6 Thus, the Court reached the intuitive result that the
stevedoring company should bear the costs of its own negligence.
B. 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA
In 1972, Congress moved to end the litigious tangle of Ryan-type
cases, which required non-negligent vessel owners to sue negligent
stevedores to recover monies the vessel owners had paid to injured em-
ployees of the stevedores. Congress did so by adding subsection 5(b) to
the LHWCA. 13 7 This amendment had two effects: first, it nullified the
131 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
132 Id. at 125-26.
133 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1982).
134 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
135 Ryan, 350 U.S. at 125.
136 Id.
137 33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1982). It reads in pertinent part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a
vessel, then such person... may bring an action against such vessel as a party.., and the
employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly .... If
such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action
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Sieracki decision by providing that "the liability of the vessel ... shall not
be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness."'' 38 This eliminated the
perverse result of Sieracki that an innocent carrier might be liable to the
employee of a negligent stevedoring company. 139 Freed of this burden,
the legislature could and did restrict the ability of a negligent vessel
owner to sue the employer for indemnity. It thereby superseded the first
aspect of the holding in Ryan.' 40 Nevertheless, prior to the 1972 amend-
ments, the second aspect of Ryan, the Ryan warranty, had developed a
life of its own as a theory of liability in marine service cases. Courts and
commentators have agreed that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA
left the Ryan warranty intact. 14 1
C. The Warranty of Workmanlike Performance
In Ryan, the Supreme Court said that the stevedoring contract "in-
cludes petitioner's obligation not only to stow the pulp rolls, but to stow
them properly and safely. Competency and safety of stowage are ines-
capable elements of the service undertaken. This obligation . . . [in-
cludes] petitioner's warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable
to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured prod-
uct.' 42 With these words, the Court inaugurated what has become the
"implied warranty of workmanlike performance." While some have ar-
gued that the Ryan warranty perished with the 1972 amendments, 143
courts have generally continued to recognize the warranty, and in some
cases have extended it.14 4 This remedy differs markedly from the negli-
gence remedy in that it purports to create contractual relief for loss
which applies even when a marine service contractor acts without fault.
shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons in providing serv-
ices to the vessel. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide shipbuilding or
repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence
of persons engaged in shipbuilding or repair services to the vessel. The liabilities of the
vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a
breach thereof at the time the injury occurred.
Id.
138 Id. See also GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 1, at 449.
139 Gilmore and Black note that the unseaworthiness doctrine has had less appeal to the courts
recently. Specifically, they criticized the extension of this doctrine by Sieracki:
From the mid-1950's on the volume of litigation of this type.., seemed to increase year by
year almost in geometric proportion. Counsel representing shipowners and employers...
deplored, on grounds of conscience, the system which enriched their law firms. The al-
ready overburdened district courts were, unquestionably, sadly strained by the Sierachi
spawned flood of litigation.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 411.
140 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 449.
141 Staring, supra note 118, at 914-15; Salter Marine, Inc. v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, 677
F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1982).
142 Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133-34.
143 See Gator Marine Serv. Towing, Inc. v.J. Roy McDermitt & Co., 651 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir.
1981).
144 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1257, 1295 (E.D. La. 1978) (recog-
nizing that the Ryan warranty is not limited to personal injury cases and did not require proof of a
contractual duty of indemnity). See also Fairmont Shipping Corp. v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 511 F.2d
1252 (2d Cir.) (applying Ryan warranty to towage contracts), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975). But cf.
Avondale Shipyards Inc. v. Vessel Thomas E. Cuffe, 434 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1977) (refusing to
extend warranty to contract to design ship).
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Federal courts have struggled over when to apply the Ryan warranty
to other marine contractors.' 45 The similarity of stevedores to surveyors,
and especially to cargo surveyors, suggests the application of Ryan. Per-
haps for this reason, the Sixth Circuit in a comparatively early opinion
held that a cargo surveyor's contract contained an implied warranty to
perform his or her work in a workmanlike manner.' 46 Nevertheless, later
case law has uniformly rejected the application of Ryan to marine
surveyors. '
47
Perhaps the most thorough discussion of the warranty issue is found
in Great American Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas. 148 Although the Great
American court was willing to recognize duties of due care, it balked at
raising these duties to the status of a warranty.149 In so holding, the Great
American court offered three arguments against applying the warranty to
surveyors. First, the court recognized that unlike the stowage of cargo,
the seaworthiness of a vessel cannot be fully delegated to a marine ser-
vice contractor. 150 Along the same vein, the court also noted that "the
activities of a classification society aboard ship rarely, if ever, would cre-
ate hazards or defects by its functions and activities." 151 Second, there
exists an
infirmity in theoretical application of the Ryan rationale to this case
.... In Ryan, the Supreme Court recognized that the implied war-
ranty.. . "is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of soundness of
its manufactured product" ..... That comparison would seem to re-
quire a "product" ..... In cases applying Ryan, therefore, the service
has involved either building or placing something on board the ship
which, by implication at least is comparable to a product.
152
Third, the court acknowledged that the application of Ryan would simply
be unjust and financially ruinous to the surveyor in that it would make it
"the absolute guarantor of any vessel it surveys."' 15 3
Later hull surveyance cases and scholarly writing have rejected the
application of Ryan to surveyors. The case of In re Amoco Cadiz, for exam-
ple, refused to apply Ryan to surveyors. 154 The decision centered on one
of the largest oil spills in history in which 220,000 tons of crude oil were
spilled off the coast of France, creating an oil slick of 600 square miles. 155
Defendants in the suit crossclaimed against the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) for failure to detect defects in the ship's steering mecha-
nism. The opinion of Judge McGarr in a federal court in Illinois found
the Ryan doctrine inapplicable since "[u]nlike the situation in Ryan, the
workmanship which caused the injuries for which Amoco has been found
145 See supra note 144.
146 Skibs A/S Gifle, 438 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1971).
147 See infra notes 148-160 and accompanying text.
148 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
149 Id. at 1012.
150 Id. at 1015.
151 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
152 338 F. Supp. at 1015 (quoting Ryan, 350 U.S. at 134).
153 Id.
154 1986 A.M.C. 1945 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
155 H. BAER, supra note 116, at § 27-1.
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liable was not entrusted solely to [the ABS]. Therefore, this court finds
that Amoco is not entitled to indemnity under the doctrine of Ryan . '156
The Amoco court apparently rested its decision on the traditional dis-
tinction between indemnity and contribution, the former of which is only
available to those who had no part in causing the injury.1 57 However, in
their memoranda of law, ABS lawyers made some additional noteworthy
arguments as to why Amoco was not entitled to indemnity. For example,
ABS contended that the shipowner, and not the surveyor, is usually in
the best position to avoid the loss. 5 8 ABS also argued that public policy
favors assessing costs against carriers and not surveyors due to the na-
tional interest in establishing a merchant marine. 159 For such reasons,
Professor Staring has described the Ryan warranty as "an endangered
species of snake which courts do not want to kill but do not want to han-
dle. The obligation which it has expressed is imminently sensible as a
duty of some degree, but it is difficult to say why it should ever have been
a warranty."' 60
IV. Analysis of Surveyor Liability
It is evident from the above overview of surveyor's liability that the
courts have, for the most part, opted in favor of assessing liability based
on negligence and against assessing liability on strict liability grounds.
Whether this approach is optimal is difficult to tell. The task of assessing
surveyors' liability in the final analysis may be as delicate as chartering
the course between Scylla and Charybdis. Nevertheless, the courts and
legislature should clarify this area of the law and decisively opt for either
strict or fault-based liability. They also ought to consider how else they
could change the law to promote safe shipping while fairly apportioning
losses between parties.
A. Arguments Favoring Strict Liability
Both the Ryan warranty and the presumptions of unseaworthiness
have characteristics of strict liability theories. The application of these
doctrines to marine surveyors would produce some positive effects. The
Ryan warranty is a form of strict liability in that it imposes costs on
marine contractors regardless of fault and despite the actual terms of the
contract. 161 As such, its growth parallels the growth of strict liability in
the products liability field.' 62 The presumption of unseaworthiness
156 In re Amoco Cadiz, 1986 A.M.C. at 1947.
157 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 341-42.
158 Plaintiff ABS' Reply Memorandum Supporting its Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment and
Memorandum in Opposition to Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at 17, Amoco Cadiz, 1986
A.M.C. 1945 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (MDL No. 376).
159 lId at 20.
160 Staring, supra note 118, at 915.
161 See supra note 144.
162 See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1257, 1294 (E.D. La. 1978).
The court explained:
The legal theories of strict liability in tort, applied on land, are gathering adherents in admi-
ralty at an accelerated pace.... Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is the
best and most widely accepted expression of the theory of strict products liability. Under
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which coincides with the unseaworthiness remedy is not a remedy itself.
Even so, it functions to shift losses to vessel owners in ship loss cases in
much the same way that a strict liability theory would shift them. 163 As
such, it is comparable to the "enterprise theory" of liability which oper-
ates to adjust losses in products liability cases from consumers to possi-
ble manufacturers of the product. 164
One major advantage of a strict liability theory is that it prevents
surveyors from escaping liability in ship loss cases, or other cases in
which evidence of negligence has been lost. Cases such as Marine Sulfur,
Great American and Steamship Mutual present the disturbing scenario of
professionals escaping liability only because the evidence of their misfea-
sance is at the bottom of the sea. 165 While it might be unjust to presume
negligence in every case of ship loss, where the ship is lost in calm seas
and the ship was surveyed just prior to voyage, the possibility of injustice
is minimized. 166 This is especially true where there is some evidence that
the surveyor conducted an inadequate survey prior to the voyage.
167
Short of adopting this remedy, the carrier and the shipowner are forced
to assume the costs of surveyors' negligence because any possible evi-
dence of negligence is lost.
The imposition of strict liability against surveyors would also better
compensate the victims of maritime losses. A significant, if non-tradi-
tional, advantage of strict liability theories is that they afford relief to
injured parties who otherwise would personally bear the loss. This ra-
that theory, anyone who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or his property is subject to liability for physical harm if the seller is engaged in
the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and does reach the consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. That rule applies even
though a seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product....
Id.
163 See supra note 74.
164 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 712. The authors opine that "[procedural] rules relating
to pleadings and burdens of proof as between litigants are rules that have the effect of allocating
risks of losses between claimants and defendants just as surely as do rules of substantive law." Id.
Prosser notes that the importance of proof rules was "catapulted to prominence" by asbestos and
diethylstibesterol (D.E.S.) cases. To deal with these cases, courts invented several doctrines which
shifted the burden of proving non-causation to the defendants. Such attempts include Anderson v.
Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975), in which a NewJersey court held
that a surgeon, hospital, and needle manufacturer were all liable for injury sustained when the nee-
dle broke "in the absence of exculpatory evidence by a particular defendant." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 36, at 714. The case ofSindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), held that a D.E.S. manufacturer was responsible for the share of injuries
proportionate to its market share of sales ofD.E.S.. Prosser says that the requirements for imposing
market share liability are:
(1) injury or illness occasioned by a fungible product ... made by all of the defendants
joined by the lawsuit; (2) injury or illness due to a defective hazard, with each having been
found to have sold the same type of product in a manner that made it unreasonably danger-
ous; (3) inability to identify the specific manufacturer of the product ... and (4) joinder of
enough of the manufacturers of the fungible product to report a substantial share of the
market.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 714.
165 See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
166 Indeed, this was the rationale for adopting the presumption of unseaworthiness as against
shipowners. See supra notes 75-77.
167 See, e.g., Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass'n v. Bureau Veritas, 380 F. Supp. 482, 490-91
(E.D. La. 1973).
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tionale was very important to the adoption of "market share" liability in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.16 8 The Sindell court said that
from a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear
the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective prod-
uct .... "IT]he cost of an injury and the loss of time and health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business."
1 69
Although the carrier is not likely to be in the same sort of impecunity as
the consumers involved in Sindell, seamen injured or killed due to survey-
ors' negligence are. The plight of such plaintiffs is especially acute in
ship loss cases where limitations of liability rules pose the threat of sub-
stantially reducing the shipowner's liability.170 Which maritime actor
eventually bears this cost is a significant social issue, since, as some schol-
ars have maintained, there is no a priori reason that victims, instead of
tortfeasors, should bear the cost of non-negligently caused injury. 17 '
Finally, the adoption of a strict liability theory as applied to survey-
ors has the potential of making sea travel safer by providing a greater
incentive to surveyors to detect unseaworthy conditions. Strict liability
theories have already operated to do so in the products liability area. 172
In that context, scholars have argued and courts have agreed that as-
signing the costs of non-negligent accidents to manufacturers will result
in fewer unfortunate accidents in the future. 173 However, this potential
advantage deserves more discussion because of its possible effect on
shippers' and carriers' liability.' 7 4
B. Arguments Disfavoring Strict Liability
Despite the application of strict liability theories to manufacturers,
shipowners and stevedores, the courts have generally refused to apply
these theories against surveyors. This is not surprising since the
merchant marine and surveyors in particular are statutorily preferred
groups. A significant amount of the hull surveying of commercial vessels
in the United States is done by the ABS, which has offices in many major
168 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
169 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936 (quoting Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.
2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)).
170 Although Congress has enacted the Loss of Life Amendments, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1982), to
ameliorate the Act's harsh effect, shipowners' liability is still much less than that of non-maritime
defendants for which the limitation of loss rules do not apply. See supra note 112.
171 See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
172 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 937.
173 Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, in M. KUPERBERG & C. BETz,
LAW, EcoNoMIcs, AND PHILOSOPHY 154, 159 (1983). Calabresi suggests that liability should be borne
by the "cheapest cost avoider," which is defined as the person "in the best position to make the cost-
benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs, and to act on that decision
once made." Id. The term is defined more colloquially as "the party 'an arbitrary initial bearer of
accident costs would ... find it most worthwhile to "bribe" in order to obtain that modification of
behavior which would lessen accident costs most.'" Id. (quoting G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF Acci-
DENTS 135 (1970)).
174 See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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cities and foreign countries. 175 The ABS was established as an agency of
the United States for the classification of government owned vessels by
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.176 These same laws recognized the
need for strong support facilities such as banking, insurance and classifi-
cation to enable national defense and foster the growth of American
shipping.177 The ABS, a nonprofit organization, and other for-profit sur-
veyors actually fulfill the policy by providing reports to the Coast Guard
and in some cases by acting as the Coast Guard's agent for the certifica-
tion of vessels.1
78
Assessing strict liability against surveyors would cause unfairness by
shifting costs from a relatively major marine actor, the carrier, to a rela-
tively minor one, the surveyor. The common law and admiralty law de-
veloped strict liability theories such as unseaworthiness because of the
unique position of carriers to prevent accidents by discovering and re-
pairing defects in the condition of the vessel.' 79 By comparison, the sur-
veyor's contact with the vessel is isolated and fleeting, and the surveyor
does not own the vessel and lacks the ability to repair it.180 This is espe-
cially true where a long period of use intervenes between surveyance and
accident.' 8 ' Moreover, these same rationales tend to prove that the car-
rier and not the surveyor is the party most capable of avoiding losses,
and thus the carrier is the appropriate party to assess against on strict
liability grounds. 1
82
The rationale sometimes used in products liability cases, that courts
should impose strict liability in order to spread the costs of accidents,
warrants less credence in the context of commercial shipping. The major
use of shipping today is for the commercial carriage of goods.18 3 Ac-
cordingly, the "victim" in shipwrecks or accidents is most likely the ship-
per or its subrogees. Unlike the consumers in Sindell, 18 4 these plaintiffs
are capable of bearing costs of accidents such that they need not be
transferred to surveyors. Moreover, seamen and harbor workers are pro-
tected by a maze of remedies including the unseaworthiness doctrine and
the LHWCA. 18
5
Finally, courts' reluctance to impose strict liability on surveyors is
justified at least in part by the failure of plaintiffs to assert a viable theory
of recovery. The Ryan warranty is ill-suited for this purpose because it
arose with respect to the loading of cargo, which duty the shipowner may
delegate to the stevedore, and which creates a product (the packaged
175 See ABS RULES, supra note 22, at Appendix J.
176 46 U.S.C. § 25 (1920) (now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3316 (Supp. III 1985)). The purpose of
this legislation was to encourage a strong merchant marine for both national security and to foster
the growth of the American maritime industry.
177 Establishment of an American Merchant Marine: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 66th
Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 1174, 1194 (1919-20).
178 46 U.S.C. § 3316(a), (c) (Supp. III 1985).
179 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
180 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bureau Veritas, 338 F. Supp. 999, 1015 (E.D. La. 1972).
181 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 173.
183 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 11.
184 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
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cargo) the safety of which may be tested. In contrast, the surveyor's du-
ties are broad and cannot be limited to a discrete product or activity.
18 6
Because of the breadth of these duties courts have commented that the
application of strict liability theories against surveyors would make them
virtual insurers of cargo.18 7 Concerns over this expansion of liability are
legitimate in light of surveyors' fears of increased liability insurance and
litigation costs.' 8 8
C. Possible Reforms
Despite some of the advantages of a strict liability approach, the cur-
rent negligence approach to marine surveyor malpractice is preferable to
the alternatives considered by the courts. This is not to say, however,
that reform is unnecessary. Courts, but more ideally Congress, could im-
prove this area by declaring or decreeing void disclaimers of liability
favoring negligent surveyors. The Supreme Court has already recog-
nized that such waivers are ineffectual in towage cases because they de-
tract from public policy goals.'8 9 Similarly, courts refuse to honor
disclaimers of liability for negligence on bills of lading pursuant to the
provisions in COGSA.' 90 It seems fair to put the surveyor on parity with
the carrier and the towage company in terms of waiver of liability.
Congress should also eliminate the incentive to sue non-traditional
defendants in ship loss cases which is created by the limitation of liability
rules.' 9 ' These rules were created in an age when shipowners were indi-
viduals who could not bear the costs of personal injury suits following
ship loss. 192 Today's shipowners are corporations with diversified own-
ership. To the extent that they need subsidies to operate, they should be
directly subsidized by the government and not at the expense of the vic-
tims of their own negligence, nor innocent surveyors who as a result of
that negligence become trapped in litigation.
Finally, Congress and the Coast Guard ought to investigate govern-
mental regulation as an alternative means of policing the surveyance in-
dustry. Laws requiring certain training or seagoing experience of
surveyors, or testing and licensing requirements established by the ABS
are possible means of governing this diverse industry. Similar laws gov-
erning the medical profession have proven more cost effective than pri-
vate litigation as a means of insuring professional integrity.' 93
186 Great American, 338 F. Supp. at 1015.
187 See, e.g., Great American, 338 F. Supp. at 1012.
188 G. Dudko, supra note 15. This concern over increased insurance premiums is real. Because of
their limited number and their potentially great exposure, surveyors, absent legislative or judicial
favor, are almost a classic case of a bad insurance risk. See C. ELLIOT & E. VAUGHAN, FOUNDATIONS OF
RISK MANAGEMENT 13 (1972) (explaining concept of risk in underwriting practice).
189 Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
190 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
192 W. McLean, supra note 115.
193 Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 525 (1988).
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VI. Conclusion
Marine surveyors play an important and necessary role in the busi-
ness of shipping. They classify and continuously inspect ships and their
cargo. In part because of this important role, American courts have
been reluctant to hold surveyors liable for the loss of surveyed vessels.
This reluctance is evidenced by the courts' failure to apply the now unfa-
vored warranty of workmanlike performance formulated in Ryan or the
unseaworthiness doctrines applied to shipowners in personal injury
cases. The courts have seen lucidly this far: An extension of Ryan or the
unseaworthiness doctrine would have the unfortunate consequences of
shifting the cost of marine accidents to a relatively minor actor, and per-
haps thereby impairing the quality of surveyance. This is not to say, how-
ever, that some reforms are not necessary. Congress and the American
courts could begin by not allowing surveyors to disclaim liability for neg-
ligent surveyance. This would put the surveyor on par with the ship-
owner who cannot avoid liability for negligence for either personal injury
or loss of cargo. Congress should also abolish the Limited Liability Act
and thereby eliminate the artificial motivation to sue surveyors in ship
loss cases. Finally, Congress should debate the merits of minimal test-
ing, training, and licensing requirements for surveyors as a means of
avoiding maritime accidents completely. Such reforms, together with the
courts' negligence approach to surveyor liability, would demand respon-
sibility and integrity from all members of the maritime industry.
Brian J. Beck
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